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Abstract 
This paper discusses the motivations, perceptions, and cognitions that are the 
foundation for group identity and stereotypes. Forming the basis for larger 
national identities, these attachments and categorizations are shown to be 
instrumental in mobilizing group members for collective action leading often to 
war. Drawing on literatures in social psychology, comparative politics, and 
international relations, an attempt is made to bridge the micro and macro levels 
of analysis. The research reviewed is organized into a framework that connects 
social-psychological processes of identity formation to inter-group conflict 
within and between nations.  Group loyalties are connected to collective 
actions through the influence of public opinion, political representation, policy-
making, and norms. This framework is broadened further by considering 
variability in a society’s political institutions, events that mark transitions in 
regimes or political cultures, and receptivity to appeals made by policy-making 
elites. The paper concludes with some implications for the resolution of 
conflicts between groups and nations and identifies a number of avenues for 
further research.  
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Preamble 
The literature on nationalism has exploded 
since the end of the cold war. Scholars in 
most of the social science disciplines have 
turned their attention to this topic. The 
conflicts that have arisen in the years 
following the collapse of the Soviet Union 
and Yugoslavia concerned matters of 
identity. These conflicts have brought the 
issue of nationalism to the fore. For 
Kedourie, nationalism has become “that 
other ideological obsession” revived in a 
“revulsion against socialist tyranny” (1993, 
p. xvii). For Gellner (1997) and others, it is a 
strong group identity that can become a 
source of virulent inter-group conflict. 
But, whether nationalism is construed as an 
ideology or as a sentimental group 
attachment, there is little doubt that it is an 
important source of conflict around the 
world. For this reason, many social scientists 
are compelled to provide an understanding 
of the origins and consequences of 
nationalism.  
In this paper I attempt to capture the recent 
scholarship on national identity. The review 
extends my earlier work on social-
psychological perspectives on group identity 
in several directions (Druckman 1994, 
2001). By so doing, the problem of national 
identity is cast in a broader framework. The 
extensions deal with each of three parts of 
the problem: group attachments, group 
categorizations, and collective action. They 
consist of: a) providing an historical context 
for the issues, b) discussing the variety of 
explanations for partisan biases and 
stereotypes contributing to inter-group 
conflict, c) developing the logic for 
connecting individual sentiments (at a micro 
level) to collective action (at a macro level), 
d) showing how the connections can be 
made, and e) proposing an agenda for further 
research on each part. While focusing 
attention primarily on the most recent 
research, the discussion takes earlier work 
into account as well. 
The paper was prepared during my residence 
as a visiting professor during 2004-2005 at 
the Australian Centre for Peace and Conflict 
Studies (ACPACS) at the University of 
Queensland (UQ) in Brisbane, Australia. An 
earlier version was presented as a public 
lecture at the UQ on February 8, 2005. 
Thanks go to the Centre and its director, 
Kevin Clements, for supporting this effort. 
 
Introduction 
Evaluative distinctions are often made 
between us and them. When Chinese 
policymakers, commenting on the China-
Taiwan conflict, say that “we would rather 
lose a thousand soldiers than lose an inch of 
land” (quoted in Newsweek, August 30, 
1999), they are assigning extraordinary value 
to their homeland, indicating the lengths 
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they would go to protect it against claims 
made by other groups. We may ask first, just 
how prevalent are these loyalties? Second, 
what are the conditions under which they 
occur, when are they exacerbated, when 
ameliorated? Third, how can intense 
loyalties be explained; what kinds of theories 
are relevant and how can they be evaluated?1  
empirical evidence for its manifestation. I 
then review alternative approaches intended 
to explain ethnocentrism. 
Categorical Distinctions (“us” and 
“them”) and Dimensions  
In his 1906 book titled Folkways, Sumner 
claimed that there is a universal syndrome of 
ethnocentrism. He posited that all groups are 
ethnocentric, defined as evaluating the 
ingroup more favorably (at the “center”) 
than outgroups (further removed from the 
“center”). It is the concomitance of ingroup 
amity and outgroup enmity that defines the 
concept. The universal claim for this 
concomitance is taken as an hypothesis. It is 
manifest in the distinctions made by group 
members in the following table: 
In this article I discuss the perceptions, 
motivations, and cognitions that are the 
bases for group identities and stereotypes. 
Providing a foundation for larger national 
identities, these attachments are shown to be 
instrumental in mobilizing group members 
for collective action leading to war.2 The 
research reviewed is organized into a 
framework that connects social-
psychological processes of identity 
formation to inter-group conflict within and 
between nations. The paper is divided into 
four parts, group attachments, group 
categorizations, reducing ethnocentrism, and 
collective actions. A concluding section is 
followed by a number of avenues for further 
research. 
Group Attachments 
Attachments are discussed in this section in 
relation to ethnocentrism. Beginning with 
Sumner’s postulation of an ethnocentric 
syndrome, I discuss some issues raised by 
the definition and provide illustrative 
 
1 Five reasons are suggested for studying this 
phenomenon: a) it is essential to the understanding of 
group dynamics and inter-group relations; b) it 
underlies conformity to group norms; c) it contributes 
to an understanding of extraordinary actions taken by 
group members; d) it contributes to difficulties in 
resolving conflicts between groups, and e) it is a basis 
for simplified images of other groups, inaccurate 
attributions, and stereotypes. 
2 Nationality is defined here in terms of identity rather 
than in terms of ethnicity or culture. National 
sentiments and identities are viewed as cutting across 
ethnic and cultural boundaries. For a similar 
definition, see Kupchan’s (1995) treatment of the 
resurgence of European nationalism.  
  
 Table 1: Attitudes towards ingroup and outgroup 
Attitudes toward ingroup Attitudes toward outgroup 
See us as virtuous and superior See them as contemptible, immoral, and 
inferior 
See our standards of value as universal, 
intrinsically true. See our customs as 
original, centrally human 
 
See us a strong See outgroups as weak 
Sanctions against ingroup murder and theft Lack of sanctions for outgroup theft and 
murder (in warfare) 
Cooperative relations with ingroup 
members 
Social distance, dislike, lack of cooperation 
with outgroup members 
Obedience to ingroup authorities Lack of obedience to outgroup authorities 
Willingness/desire to remain an ingroup 
member 
Absence of conversion to outgroup 
Willingness to fight and die for the ingroup No willingness to fight and die for outgroups 
 Use of outgroups as bad examples in child-
rearing 
 Blaming of outgroup for ingroup troubles 
 Distrust and fear of the outgroup  
 
These depictions, made originally by 
Sumner (1906) and summarized by LeVine 
and Campbell (1972), are presented as 
either-or distinctions. They are contrasts of 
absolutes: the ingroup-outgroup attitudes are 
polar opposites. Such contrasts are advanced 
by theorists who take a hard view of inter-
group conflict, namely, group members 
show considerable loyalty to firmly-bounded 
groups that persist over time (Horowitz, 
1999). Does a test of the universal 
hypothesis depend on confirming the 
absolute categorizations suggested by 
Sumner? If so, then, it is likely that the 
hypothesis would be rejected. Should we 
then consider the differences in attitudes and 
perceptions along dimensions such as “more 
or less in favor of the ingroup?” Such 
dimensions are advanced by theorists who 
take a soft view of inter-group conflict, 
namely, group members are motivated by 
rewards (rather than allegiance based on 
affection) provided by groups whose 
boundaries are problematic and malleable 
(Horowitz, 1999). If so, then the hypothesis 
is likely to be confirmed. Consider the 
following evaluations of the ingroup bias 
hypothesis: 
a) In ratings of outgroups and ingroups by 
many people, all the outgroups receive a 
net unfavorable index and all the 
ingroups receive a favorable balance;  
b) the average outgroup described by each 
ingroup receives a net description that is 
unfavorable while all ingroups receive a 
favorable balance;  
c)  all outgroups receive a less favorable 
description than does the focal ingroup;  
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d)  the average outgroup described by an 
ingroup receives a less favorable 
description than does the ingroup for all 
ingroups studied.  
All of these are correlational tests of the 
hypothesis; each suggests a negative 
correlation between ingroup and outgroup 
ratings or judgments. None supports the 
Sumner conception that ingroups are 
adulated while outgroups are derogated; all 
of them posit that outgroups are liked less 
(or evaluated less positively) than ingroups 
with some groups receiving more/less 
favorable ratings than others. But, this too 
begs the question of how high a correlation 
is needed for confirmation? Put another way, 
where should the boundaries be drawn that 
satisfy the criterion of favorability to 
ingroups? What does the empirical evidence 
suggest? 
Two types of evidence are laboratory, 
including simulation, and field evidence in 
the ethnographic tradition. The former is 
more suited to hypothesis testing, the latter 
to descriptions of actual intergroup relations. 
Laboratory tests have mostly consisted of 
staging a conflict or contest between groups 
and assessing self-reported attitudes between 
members of the groups. An example is 
provided by a simulation study of 
ethnocentrism (Druckman, 1968). 
Ethnocentrism in the Inter-Nation 
Simulation  
In this simulation, naval recruits were 
assigned to one of four roles (a central 
decision maker [CDM], an external decision 
maker [EDM], a decision maker for force 
[DMF], and an aspiring CDM in one of five 
“nations,” two strong nations possessing a 
nuclear capability (OMNE and UTRO), two 
weak non-nuclear nations allied to the strong 
nations (ERGA and ALGO), and a neutral 
nation (INGO). 
This structure provided an opportunity to test 
many hypotheses about ethnocentrism: bias 
by ally or enemy, by strong or weak nation, 
by role, and by changes in the alliances. 
Eleven replications of the simulation made it 
possible to evaluate the hypotheses 
statistically. Each role player rated all others 
on a set of eight “personality traits” (liking 
traits, respect traits, and potency traits). By 
having role players rate individuals rather 
than groups, we reduced the extent to which 
the purpose of the ratings would be apparent. 
The results showed all the behavior 
predicted by ethnocentrism theory: they 
rated members of their own and allied 
nations more favorably on most traits than 
members of enemy nations; they rated 
former enemies who had become allies more 
favorably than long-term allies; they rated 
former allies who had become enemies 
(renegades) less favorably than long-term 
enemies; the bias was particularly strong on 
the game-relevant liking traits; they 
respected strong enemies but did not like 
them whereas they liked weak enemies more 
than they respected them; the more favorable 
the ingroup ratings, the less favorable the 
outgroup ratings (as expected by 
ethnocentrism theory). And, group members 
who had more personal contact with 
members of other groups (“nations”) (the 
EDMs) displayed less of these ethnocentric 
behaviors while the aspiring CDMs 
displayed more of them.  
These are impressive results. They are 
dimensionalized tests of the ethnocentrism 
hypotheses, in terms of the over or under-
evaluation of members of one or another 
type of nation or role (e.g., the excess 
evaluation of members of own group in 
relation to members of other groups).3 They 
                                                 
3 The procedure consisted of evaluating “halo errors” 
in ratings (see Guilford, 1954). These are the 
systematic tendencies to overvalue or undervalue a 
particular ratee (member of another nation, ally or 
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do not provide evidence for the categorical 
distinctions made by Sumner. Further, they 
are relevant to a particular setting in which 
ethnocentrism manifests itself, competitive 
decision making; and, to a particular kind of 
evaluation which may be more sensitive to 
the bias, personality judgments. Although 
more limited in scope, many other laboratory 
studies reinforce these findings. The most 
interesting confirmation comes from studies 
using the minimal group paradigm. 
Minimal-group paradigm experiments 
Minimal-group experiments consist of 
assigning subjects randomly to one or 
another ad hoc group labeled as group X or 
Y or, in some studies, to the blue-eyed or 
brown-eyed group. The classical experiment 
consists of asking all subjects to allocate 
points to each ad hoc group. Variants on this 
theme have consisted of having each group 
performs a non-competitive problem-solving 
task. Following the task, members are asked 
to rate the two groups on a number of 
evaluative adjectives. In many of these 
experiments, subjects show statistically-
significant differences in ratings favoring 
their own group (see the reviews by Tajfel, 
1982, Brewer and Kramer, 1985, and 
Messick and Mackie, 1989). The results of 
these experiments suggest that the ingroup-
favoring bias does not depend on 
competition. It seems to occur as a result of 
merely being a member of a short-lived and 
arbitrarily-formed group (e.g., Brewer and 
Silver, 1978). The prevalence of these 
findings has encouraged some investigators 
to seek an explanation.  
A popular explanation is based on the 
observation that people want to feel good 
about themselves relative to others. 
Identification with groups – even those 
                                                                          
enemy) in relation to all other ratees and raters. Over 
or underevaluation is a relative term in the sense of 
taking account of a whole system of raters and ratees. 
defined in terms of arbitrary or minimal 
criteria – enhances a person’s self-esteem. A 
number of the early minimal-group 
experiments supported this explanation and 
showed that one’s own group was imbued 
with positive valence. More recently, 
experiments demonstrated that people 
identify with groups because the identity 
reduces uncertainty about how to perform a 
task, about the experimental setting, or about 
the correct solution. To the extent that 
identity does reduce the aversive effects of 
uncertainty, the group is evaluated favorably 
(ingroup bias). This effect then leads to 
positive self evaluations (enhanced self 
esteem) and positive evaluations of other 
group members (social attraction). Thus, the 
cognitive effect of uncertainty reduction may 
precede the motivational result of enhanced 
self-esteem. These and other explanations 
for group identification are discussed further 
below. I will also consider the question of 
whether the increased group attraction can 
occur without the corresponding outgroup 
derogation that defines ethnocentrism.  
Ethnographic evidence 
Further confirmation for ingroup bias comes 
from ethnographic studies. In their survey of 
the Human Relations Area Files, Campbell 
and LeVine (1961) concluded that of the 36 
groups on which there was some information 
available, 35 were judged to be ethnocentric. 
This means that the content of the stories 
told by informants had ethnocentric imagery. 
Although this approach is highly 
interpretive, the consistency of the reports 
over so many cases provides another source 
of support for the universality hypothesis. 
Even more impressive is Firth’s (1957) 
report of ingroup-outgroup cleavages that 
developed on a small homogeneous island 
where people lived under identical 
conditions.  
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Thus, ingroup-favoring bias is a robust 
phenomenon. The desire to form groups and 
to differentiate them from others is so strong 
that it is easily activated under a variety of 
conditions (Horowitz, 1999). However, its 
prevalence does not in itself offer an 
explanation for its occurrence. It may be 
regarded as a defining feature of groups in 
the sense that a group’s survival depends on 
the loyalty of its members. We can say with 
confidence that a certain degree of 
ethnocentrism seems to exist in practically 
all groups. The key here is the phrase “a 
certain degree.” Its strength is likely to vary 
with a number of aspects of group structure 
and culture, the situation, and the group 
characteristics on which it is assessed. It may 
also be stronger at certain periods within a 
group’s history. Further, we know that there 
are instances of negative ethnocentrism – 
where members derogate their own group in 
relation to other groups (Swartz, 1961). And, 
the phenomenon can be construed differently 
when considered in the context of multiple 
groups (Druckman, 1994). Thus, while 
common-place, the extent and form of its 
expression varies.  
Explaining Ethnocentrism 
In this section, I address the question of how 
the phenomenon of ethnocentrism can be 
explained. Historically, explanations have 
come from two sources of theorizing: one, 
referred to as social cognition, was prevalent 
in the U.S. during the 1970s and 1980s; the 
other, referred to as social identity, was 
prevalent in Europe during this same period. 
The former emphasizes the way that 
individuals process information about others 
(including groups) and focuses on 
categorization. The latter emphasizes the 
social context of interaction within groups 
and focuses on the way that individuals 
relate to groups. Although this distinction 
depicts a contrast in the locus for 
explanations of ethnocentrism, the two 
approaches actually overlap and, more 
recently, are combined in providing a more 
comprehensive explanation. In other words, 
people are shown to prefer categorizing and 
distinguishing (in both descriptive and 
evaluative terms) between their own and 
other groups – perhaps for reasons related to 
self esteem – but the implications of this 
categorizing are understood in relation to 
such group phenomena as conformity and 
group influence, the development of group 
norms, cohesion, and collective action. The 
categorization research provides a cognitive 
underpinning for social identity processes 
(see Abrams and Hogg, 1999).  
An attempt was made by Operario and Fiske 
(1999) to develop a framework that 
incorporates both the social cognition and 
social identity perspectives. They do this by 
drawing on the converging themes of 
individual-level processes and societal 
context, showing how researchers in each 
tradition can learn from each other. Social 
cognition researchers would expand their 
perspective by including societal variables 
such as power and hierarchy into their 
models. Similarly, social identity researchers 
would strengthen their theories by including 
carefully defined aspects of the self, 
particularly the way that individuals 
internalize their group’s norms. More 
generally, this framework addresses the age-
old challenge for social psychologists which 
is to integrate the person with the societal-
cultural environment. 
Five explanations, deriving from these 
approaches, have received considerable 
attention in the literature. 
1) Tajfel’s (1981) self-esteem theory posits 
that by regarding one’s own group as 
being superior to other groups, the 
individual experiences an enhancement 
in his or her self esteem. Experiments 
have shown that when individuals were 
allowed to discriminate (invidiously) 
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their own group from another group, 
their self esteem increased. It did not 
increase if the discrimination was not 
made. However, more recent findings 
raise questions about the earlier results 
and their interpretation (see Brewer and 
Brown, 1998, for a review).  
2) Turner’s (1987) self-categorization 
theory posits that people accentuate 
differences such that objects in the same 
category appear more similar and those 
in different categories appear more 
different. This accentuation then leads to 
an evaluative preference for those who 
are more similar to oneself. The 
categorizations precede the bias. This is 
thought to be a direct relationship that 
does not depend on invoking an 
intervening process of enhanced self-
esteem. However, Brown and Adams 
(1986) found that even when people are 
similar in many ways, they find ways to 
make distinctions. For example, the 
comparison may be on performance 
rather than group characteristics in the 
case of similar groups. Their evidence 
suggests even stronger biases for similar 
or neighboring countries. And, they 
noted that although groups may enjoy 
friendly and cooperative relations they 
still often find ways to derogate each 
other in making ingroup-favoring 
judgments (especially in competitive 
situations).  
3) Insko and his colleagues’ (1988) 
consensual strategy theory posits that 
when groups develop unilateral 
strategies or plans, they become 
increasingly competitive and hostile 
toward other groups. The strategies 
contribute to cohesion which may 
intervene between the planning activity 
and the attitudes or behaviors. 
Druckman’s (1968a) study of simulated 
collective bargaining supports this 
group-process explanation: Teams that 
prepared strategies prior to bargaining 
developed more cohesion which led to 
more impasses than teams that studied 
the issues. Similarly, Thompson’s 
(1993) minimal-group experiment 
showed that when intra-group 
negotiations were conducted without a 
corresponding inter-group negotiation, 
the ingroup-favoring bias was enhanced. 
The intra-group deliberations may have 
increased the group’s cohesion. And, 
Operario and Fiske (1999) offered the 
hypothesis that ingroup bias is more 
pronounced among persons who have 
internalized their group than among 
those who perceive their group status as 
being contingent on the situation. 
Members of cohesive groups are more 
likely to identify more strongly with 
their group and internalize its norms.  
4) Hogg and Mullin (1999) showed that 
ingroup bias varied with uncertainty. As 
I noted above, these investigators 
proposed that group membership is a 
way of reducing uncertainty. To the 
extent that the group is viewed by 
members as serving this function, it is 
imbued with positive affect that 
generalizes to self and fellow members. 
Enhanced self esteem and categorization 
are regarded as effects of uncertainty 
reduction rather than as reasons for 
favoring ingroups in relation to 
outgroups or as direct consequences of 
membership per se. 
5) Hornsey and Hogg (2000) suggested 
that ethnocentric bias is strengthened 
when one’s own group is threatened. 
Identity threat is posited as an 
organizing concept for understanding 
subgroup relations. Unlike the 
explanations discussed above, Hornsey 
and Hogg consider group identity in the 
context of multiple groups that 
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characterize societies and organizations. 
They emphasize the tensions that exist 
between superordinate (e.g., national) 
and subordinate (e.g., ethnic) identities. 
Pressures placed on citizens to 
assimilate to the superordinate, national 
identity can threaten distinctive 
subgroup identities not shared with all 
members of a nation. A number of ideas 
are offered for achieving a balance 
between the more distinctive subgroup 
identities and the more inclusive 
superordinate identities. These ideas 
include perceptions of inclusiveness, 
structural relations between groups, 
representation of subgroups in the 
leadership of an organization or society, 
and power and status relations among 
subgroups. The goal is to minimize 
threats to identity by encouraging a 
“dual identification (that) reconfigures 
subgroup relations so that they become 
relatively cooperative and harmonious; 
destructive conflict becomes 
cooperative competition, and 
discrimination becomes differentiation” 
(Hornsey and Hogg, 2000: 153). 
The various explanations can be considered 
together. Group membership contributes to 
self-esteem which, if enhanced, reinforces 
loyalty. The ingroup bias helps individuals 
reduce uncertainty by organizing their world 
and placing themselves in it. Further, the 
loyalties help them distinguish between 
those to support and whom to avoid. And, 
such loyalties can foster a consensus among 
the members that may become self fulfilling 
and difficult to change. The stronger the 
loyalty, the more likely members will hold 
similar views and endorse similar strategies 
which, in turn, strengthen the loyalty. This 
makes it less likely that discrepant 
information will filter through or serve to 
change their views, thereby reducing 
complexity and uncertainty. Perceived 
similarity increases the strength of group 
identification which enhances the 
discrimination between groups and the 
accompanying evaluative bias (Brewer and 
Miller, 1996). It is strengthened further when 
members perceive their identity to be 
threatened by other, more powerful groups. 
Identity threat accentuates group 
distinctiveness in the context of a larger 
society or organization.   
This cycle may be accentuated in periods of 
widespread social uncertainty and 
transformative change. People are often seen 
to become more committed in their 
identification with their group’s belief 
systems and ideologies. They may also be 
more vulnerable to scapegoating or 
conspiracy theories that target specific 
outgroups. At the extreme, identification 
with “totalist” groups can translate into 
atrocities as Staub (1989) showed with four 
cases of twentieth century genocide 
(Armenia, the holocaust, Cambodia, and 
Argentina in the 1970s). Using data from the 
Human Relations Area Files, Ember and 
Ember (1992) showed that fear about an 
uncertain future increased the frequency of 
war, especially for non-State societies. And, 
Kupchan noted that: “Political and economic 
transformation may as a matter of course 
induce the intensification of ethnic 
sentiment; such sentiment provides 
psychological bearings in the midst of 
change” (1995:11). The sentiments, and 
accompanying ethnocentric biases, are 
intensified further when the changes threaten 
the subgroup, ethnic identities as would 
occur in reaction to discrimination from 
majorities. A question of interest is what can 
be done to break into this cycle before it 
becomes manifest in these forms of 
collective action? 
Overlooked by these psychological 
approaches, however, is a social system-
maintenance function served by an ingroup-
favoring bias. Preferential judgments and 
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associated behaviors support a status quo 
where some groups are privileged more than 
others. The social distance that is reinforced 
by “us-them” distinctions preserves a “top-
dog/bottom-dog” social hierarchy. For 
political elites, preferential judgments, 
expressed as stereotypes, bolster “the 
struggle to assert and maintain control in a 
world of dislocations and ambivalences” 
(Pickering, 2001:211). But, “us-them” 
distinctions may also engender pride and 
provide a sense of community support for 
members of less privileged social groups.  
Group Categorizations  
Categorizations are discussed in this section 
in terms of stereotypes. I consider issues of 
accuracy, shared images, and stereotype 
change. This discussion is a basis for 
considering ways of reducing ethnocentrism, 
including how alternative orientations 
toward ingroups and outgroups are 
developed and sustained.  
Images of Groups as Stereotypes  
I have discussed perceptual categorization as 
an explanation for ethnocentric bias. These 
are simple, often invidious, distinctions 
made between groups.4 I have not, however, 
                                                 
                                                                         
4 Perkins (1979) has argued that it is misleading to 
depict stereotypes as being simple rather than 
complex. They have both features. On the one hand 
they simplify social relations by subsuming many 
people into a convenient category. This is referred to 
in this section as a “cognitive miser” phenomenon. 
On the other hand, they often reflect a complex social 
history. A number of popular stereotypes are deeply 
rooted in ideological constructions that have evolved 
over the course of decades or even centuries. An 
example cited often is the notion of the 
“irresponsible” black person. This stereotype has 
been used to justify the subordination of black people 
in western societies and is referred to by Chen and 
Tyler (2001) as legitimizing myths. They serve to 
promote the interests of advantaged groups and 
maintain the status differential between them and 
disadvantaged groups in a society.  
discussed the descriptive or evaluative 
content of these categorizations. Content 
refers to three aspects of images: a) the 
group being depicted as “they are (all of 
them with few exceptions) …”; b) what is 
said about that group as “they are 
arrogant…”, and c) how it is said along a 
positive to negative (valence) dimension as 
“they are undesirable/their arrogance is 
inexcusable…” One issue is the extent to 
which these images are accurate. Another 
issue is the extent to which the image is 
shared by members of the same group. A 
third issue to the extent to which stereotypes 
change. 
Many studies gather data on individuals’ 
perceptions of groups or nations. The 
perceptions are regarded as being 
stereotypes if they are simplified 
descriptions (adjectives, “traits”) of the 
target group. To the extent that the other 
group is viewed as being homogeneous on a 
particular descriptor, it is regarded as a 
stereotype. Although there may be only 
moderate levels of agreement on descriptors 
across the population, they are stereotypes 
from the standpoint of the particular 
individuals sampled.  The question then is 
the extent to which they are accurate.  
The question of accuracy 
Social psychologists approach this question 
with ambivalence. The long tradition of 
stereotyping research holds that these are 
simplified unrealistic images that do more 
harm than good, even if there is a grain of 
truth in them. Writing from a different 
disciplinary perspective, Pickering sums up 
his treatment as follows: “Stereotypes are 
also discriminatory because the stunted 
features or attributes of others which 
characterize them are considered to form the 
basis for negative or hostile judgements, the 
rationale for exploitative, unjust treatment, 
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or the justification for aggressive behaviour. 
In a word, stereotypes are bad” (2001: 10). 
Some recent analyses of categorization are 
critical of this viewpoint or tradition, 
claiming that categorization can be 
functional and may be more accurate than 
inaccurate. This research has gained 
prominence with the appearance of the Lee 
et al. (1995) book on stereotype accuracy. 
The central argument of this book is that 
stereotype researchers have historically 
regarded stereotypes as unrealistic, 
inaccurate and pejorative descriptions of 
groups, and should thus be discouraged. In 
effect, they have “stereotyped” stereotypes! 
To balance this state of affairs, the authors 
suggest that many stereotypes may be 
reasonably accurate depictions of groups 
and, if so, we should spend more time 
evaluating their accuracy. The challenge is 
to determine how accuracy is to be judged. 
On this issue we come across a difference of 
opinion about making categorical judgments 
about groups of people. Judgment 
researchers, in the Baysian tradition, 
emphasize the importance of categorical 
information that is probabilistic (Funder, 
1995). They show that knowledge of base 
rates (percentages of rich and poor, 
engineers and lawyers, coups and non-
coups) can improve prediction for groups. 
Indeed, there are certain categories about 
which statistical information can be obtained 
– such as percent of ethnic groups in 
different occupations, academic 
achievement, family size. However, even on 
these sorts of categories, inaccurate 
stereotypes can occur, first, in absence of the 
information and, second, by overestimating 
the size of the group in these categories or 
the frequency of events that occur in those 
countries.  
It can be argued that the Baysian approach is 
relevant for available statistical information 
about groups. It is not relevant for the more 
subjective or socially constructed categories 
such as judging personalities of people or 
characteristics of groups. Viewing a group as 
being more homogeneous than it is (or can 
be) is a stereotype that, despite any grain of 
truth, is likely to be more inaccurate than 
accurate. At issue in this debate is whether a 
person should react to other people in terms 
of their membership in groups or as 
individuals apart from group membership. 
Although there are times when it may be 
useful to use categorical information, it must 
be recognized that an individual’s or group’s 
behavior is multiply determined and, thus, 
cannot be accounted for in large part by any 
particular group affiliation.  
The issue of accuracy turns on whether 
members of a group behave consistently in 
certain ways across situations which have 
both time and place dimensions. It is 
unlikely that people placed in the same 
group category display many of the same 
behaviors across situations. It is more likely 
that categorizing is an attribution of the 
observer. The social cognition literature 
points toward functions of categorical or 
stereotypical thinking in terms of avoiding 
having to confront social complexity. This 
has been referred to by Baron (1995) and 
others as the “cognitive miser” effect and 
contrasts with approaches that view 
self/other categorizations in terms of 
structures of inequality and power relations. 
(See Pickering, 2001, chapter 5, for a 
critique of the “cognitive economy” 
approach.)  
Social categories may, however, serve 
another function for organizations. By 
“treating other people as types may facilitate 
the development of group stratification” 
(Baron, 1995:137). At the organizational 
level of analysis, the tendency to fit people 
into roles contributes to the adaptive 
functioning of groups. This can become a 
self-fulfilling prophecy in the sense of 
individuals adhering to the expectations of 
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their assigned roles; hence, we observe a 
high frequency of role-determined behavior 
as described by role theory. This suggests an 
interplay between the psychological 
(attractiveness of categorical thinking) and 
the social (functions of organizational 
categories) levels of analysis. Stereotype 
accuracy may be a result of people within 
organizations behaving according to role 
expectations, and this “accuracy” may be 
pragmatic for group or organizational 
functioning. Or, in Baron’s words: 
“cognitive and social complexity … may be 
seen as having co-evolved in the service of 
adaptive functioning at the group level 
(1995:137). Further, to the extent that role 
expectations are shared widely within an 
organization –  thus, qualifying as social 
stereotypes – conformity pressures to behave 
in certain ways are strong, thereby, creating 
the impression of accuracy as a circular 
process. This argument claims that accuracy 
increases as people enact their stereotyped 
roles. Much like the idea of a self-fulfilling 
prophesy, stereotyped groups validate the 
attributions of them made by others by 
behaving in a manner that reinforces those 
very depictions. And, these behaviors are 
rooted in the social structures – or power 
relations defined by those structures -- of the 
societies within which the stereotyped group 
members live. Note in this regard the 
conformity to stereotyped images of 
subordinated groups such as African-
Americans prior to the U.S. civil rights 
movement of the 1960s.  
In fact, we can never really pin the accuracy 
issue down. By definition, stereotypes are 
imprecise, notwithstanding a “kernel of 
truth.” But, accuracy may not be the 
important question asked about stereotypes. 
What is likely to be more important is how 
widely they are accepted and their 
consequences. Following Pickering’s 
argument: “What counts is how they 
circulate, and with what consequences, as 
base coins in the economy of discourse and 
representation; how they attain their 
symbolic currency among those involved in 
their exchange” (2001: 25-26). We turn now 
to the matter of circulation. 
Shared images of groups.   
Another issue is the extent to which images 
or depictions of groups are shared, 
irrespective of their accuracy. Most of the 
research deals with the categories used by 
individuals to describe groups. Fewer studies 
focus on the issue of shared categorizations 
or images. The idea of a stereotype implies a 
widely shared view or image of groups. 
Implications for collective action would 
seem to depend more on the extent of 
sharing than on the views of particular 
individual: Widespread images are more 
normative; they may facilitate efforts to 
mobilize populations for conflict. This is 
referred to in the literature as uniformity, 
consensus or stereotypy and various 
agreement indexes have been constructed to 
assess agreement. The indices are calculated 
on the basis of the extent of similarity 
between raters in the way they distribute 
their choice of descriptors or adjectives from 
a list of categories given to them. The index 
depicts the extent to which a particular 
image of another (out)group is shared by 
members of the same (in) group. (See 
Lambert and Klineberg, 1967, Druckman 
and Ludwig, 1970, and Druckman et al., 
1974, for examples of computations.)   
Lambert and Klineberg’s (1967) study found 
that few descriptive terms but many 
evaluative terms were used by children to 
depict unfriendly (and unfamiliar) nations. 
When little information was available about 
other groups, descriptions tend to be vague 
(fewer terms, more of a stereotype) but 
evaluative terms proliferate (less of a 
stereotype). Familiar nations were less 
stereotyped than unfamiliar nations on 
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descriptive terms. Friendly nations were 
stereotyped more than unfriendly nations on 
evaluative terms. The vagueness 
(proliferation of descriptive terms) with 
respect to unfriendly nations may reflect a 
process where there is little desire to seek 
information. This research addresses both 
cognitive – the possession of information or 
knowledge about another group–  and 
motivational – the desire to seek information 
for a more accurate and detailed description 
– processes.   
In an attempt to bring the research on social 
cognition into closer contact with the work 
on motivation, Sherman and his colleagues 
(1999) point out that the way we perceive 
ingroups and outgroups is likely to depend 
on both the extent to which we attribute 
properties of entitativity to them (see 
Campbell, 1958) and the extent to which 
their members value identification with 
them. They suggest that “ingroups with high 
social identity value are important to us, and 
such importance implies that the group is a 
meaningful, coherent, ongoing entity. Such 
perceptions of entitativity bestow properties 
that we want in highly valued groups” 
(1999:105). The relationship between these 
concepts is circular: On the one hand, we 
want our highly valued groups to have 
entitativity. On the other hand, groups with 
high perceived entitativity are more likely to 
be highly valued. Commitment, permanence, 
and investment enhance both perceived 
entitativity (a cognitive process) and social 
identity (a motivational process). 
Less is said by Sherman and his colleagues 
about the causes or effects of perceived 
entitativity of outgroups. High perceived 
entitativity is unlikely to lead to high social 
identity with these groups. In fact, it is likely 
to lead to the perception of threat with 
corresponding stereotypes or demonic 
images. Further, high perceived entitativity 
of outgroups may lead to more agreement 
among ingroup members on their 
characteristics (less diversity in describing 
them) with implications for collective action. 
Whether ingroups or outgroups are typically 
perceived as more or less entity-like is an 
empirical issue that has received some 
attention. Early studies by Taft (1959) and 
Druckman and Ludwig (1970) reported more 
agreement among group members on 
adjectives used to describe their ingroup than 
outgroups, whether allies or enemies. These 
findings can be interpreted along the lines of 
Shapiro’s argument that the self (one’s own 
nation) is viewed as being a coherent and 
unified body while the other (other nations) 
is thought of as being disorderly and 
threatening: “… external disorder, that is, the 
practices in the world that do not comport 
with the system of order within which one 
resides, will be particularly threatening” 
(1996: 477). This argument is reinforced by 
Pickering’s depiction of the stereotyping 
process. For him, stereotypes serve as 
distancing strategies, “separating what is 
seen as threatening and disturbing (the other) 
from that which is regarded as acceptable 
and legitimate (or the normative self)” 
(2001: 174). However, other studies showed 
that perceived entitativity depends on the 
types of adjectives used to depict the groups. 
Separating descriptions of groups from 
evaluations of them, these investigators 
found more uniformity in describing disliked 
than liked nations but less uniformity in 
evaluating them (Lambert and Klineberg, 
1967; Druckman et al., 1974).  
Stereotype change.  
A third issue concerns the way that 
stereotypes change. Oakes et al. (1999) 
argue that stereotypes are the product of 
particular intergroup relationships, not their 
source or cause. This is a chicken and egg 
problem: Which should be changed first, the 
stereotype or the relationship between the 
groups? Some researchers argue that the 
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route to improved inter-group relations is 
through changing images of other groups; 
the relationship follows the images. Cottam 
(1987), for example, claimed that images of 
enemies drive national policies or strategies. 
Others have argued that the inter-group 
relationship must change before the images 
can change; the images reflect the relations 
(Sherif and Sherif, 1965). Ethnocentric 
images or values are located in inter-group 
relations, which include differences between 
groups in power, rather than in individual 
attitudes. Ingroup-outgroup distinctions 
reflect and are preceded by those relations. 
Thus, stereotypes are understood best, and 
should (according to this perspective) be 
analyzed first, from a social rather than 
individual-cognitive perspective (see also 
Sherif, 1967). 
This debate is similar to the discussions in 
social psychology about the relationship 
between attitudes and behavior (e.g., 
Wicker, 1969). Until some pioneering 
research, stimulated by the theory of 
cognitive dissonance, it was widely believed 
that attitude change preceded behavior 
change. The research showed the opposite, 
namely, that behavior change often preceded 
attitude change. The attitudes served to 
rationalize and, thus, be consistent with the 
behavior (e.g., Varela, 1971). The Oakes et 
al (1999) research indicated that stereotypes 
reflected the reality of inter-group relations; 
images changed in the context of changes in 
inter-group relations. A policy implication of 
this research is that mandated or legal 
inducements to change relations between 
groups will affect the attitudes that reflect 
those relationships.  
Images or stereotypes are not simply 
influenced in mechanical ways by new 
information. Information-processing models 
of categorization are incomplete if they 
ignore the matrix of social relations in which 
people are also embedded. Images are 
influenced by the social context that gives 
the information meaning. However, the way 
images and “realities” interact may be more 
complicated. While stereotypes reflect and 
support inter-group relationships, they also 
reinforce these relationships. By reinforcing 
negative inter-group relationships, the 
images serve to maintain them, thereby 
acting as a cause rather than as an effect. 
This is what is meant by a circular 
relationship between images or 
categorizations and behavior or relations 
between groups. It would seem then that 
interventions would need to deal with both 
the images and the relationships. 
Interventions may be particularly helpful in 
times of social tensions when stereotypes 
become more pronounced and hostile and 
more difficult to change (Tajfel and Fraser, 
1978).  
Reducing Ethnocentrism 
Despite the prevalence of ingroup-favoring 
biases and stereotypes, all groups do not 
fight or express hostility toward other groups 
all the time. The variability of the 
phenomenon may be understood in terms of 
several observations. One is that emotions 
may be transitory. Another is that intergroup 
contact may lead to improved relations. A 
third concerns the effects of poor 
performance in competitions. A fourth is that 
large groups may have difficulty 
coordinating for collective action. And a 
fifth is that members may spread their 
loyalties across many groups. Each of these 
observations is discussed in turn followed by 
a longer discussion of patriotism and 
nationalism. 
On emotions  
It was noted earlier that group loyalties are 
easy to establish. The issue is that, once 
established, how resistant are they to 
change? On the one hand, we observe that 
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people often make considerable sacrifices on 
behalf of their groups (Campbell, 1972). 
Partisan or ethnocentric biases are strong. 
On the other hand, we observe that emotions 
can be fleeting. Rapid swings in feelings can 
occur as events or leadership changes: 
Observe how rapidly the Chinese became 
“good guys” after Richard Nixon went to 
China, how fast Saddam Hussein became “a 
devil” after his invasion of Kuwait, and how 
feelings expressed by Americans toward the 
US military changed dramatically following 
the war in the Persian Gulf. Could it be that 
the loyalty we observe is situational, even if 
it is strong? The ease with which identities 
are established suggests that they can also be 
re-established with relative ease. Note in this 
regard how quickly we change our views of 
former allies (enemies) from positive 
(negative) to negative (positive), as shown 
by the findings reported by Druckman 
(1968). More recent findings reported by 
Haslam and Turner (1992) also highlight the 
way the stereotypes vary with changes in 
context.  
On intergroup contact  
The research literature on intergroup 
contacts or exchange programs suggests that 
the conditions of contact influence the 
impact of the experience on attitudes and 
perceptions. Contact per se with members of 
another group does not produce predictable 
effects on attitudes. The interactions can 
provoke areas of sensitivity or offer the 
promise of rewarding relationships. Such 
factors as the relative status of the groups, 
the goals of the exchange, perceived cultural 
differences, and variables that affect one’s 
adjustment to the new environment have 
been found to make a difference. (See 
Pettigrew, 1998 and Druckman, 1980, for 
reviews of the studies.) While getting to 
know outgroup members may improve 
relations with their group, it may also call 
into question one’s own identity. This may 
create anxiety and uncertainty which are 
reduced by a strengthened group identity and 
derogation of the outgroup, leading to 
deteriorated relations. In their simulated 
negotiation experiments, Druckman and 
Broome (1991) found that contact led to 
more positive perceptions of the other group 
and more agreements with them when both 
familiarity and liking were high. In her 
minimal-group paradigm experiments, 
Thompson (1993) found that when a 
mutually-beneficial or integrative outcome 
was available in inter-group negotiations, the 
extent of the ingroup-favoring bias was 
reduced.   
On group performance  
Research has shown that there is a circular 
relationship between performance and 
cohesion (Landers et al., 1982). Good 
performing teams are cohesive teams 
although the direction of the relationship is 
difficult to disentangle. Performance has 
rarely been studied in the social identity 
literature. Groups are more likely to attract 
members when they serve members’ needs. 
Especially for task-oriented groups, 
members strive for good performance. One 
consequence of poor-performing groups is 
reduced loyalty or identification and the 
concomitant loss in cohesion. The socio-
emotional functions served by groups cannot 
readily be separated from their task 
functions. Performance is both influenced by 
and influences the socio-emotional functions 
served by groups. Hypotheses about the 
relationship between identification and 
performance are a basis for new research on 
identity.  
On mobilization  
Issues concerning readiness to take action 
have also not been addressed in this 
literature. Although loyalty contributes to 
motivation to act, it may also play a role in 
matters of coordination and related logistics 
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-- referred to also as readiness --- concerning 
the action itself. Among the group 
characteristics that have been shown to 
influence mobilization are concentration, 
autonomy, homogeneity, leadership 
centralization, communication effectiveness, 
and provision in the sense of members 
receiving rewards from the group 
(Druckman and Green, 1986). Again, to the 
extent that these characteristics facilitate 
performance, they are likely to enhance 
loyalty as noted above in the cohesion-
performance relationship. To the extent that 
they impede group performance, they are 
likely to reduce loyalty. However, this 
supposition remains to be evaluated. 
Although group performance and 
mobilization issues are central in the study 
of groups they have been treated largely 
apart from identity issues.  
On multiple groups 
Groups are best understood in relation to 
other groups about which members are 
aware. Much of the laboratory literature 
consists of experiments with a small number 
of interacting groups. People have multiple 
group identifications: How then do they 
decide to relate to each of these groups? 
How do these various groups contribute to 
an individual’s identity? Loyalty to one 
group does not preclude having attachments 
to other groups. Some of these attachments 
may be to non-membership groups, referred 
to as reference groups (Merton, 1957). 
Studies done in Latin America have shown 
that people may actually derogate their own 
group in relation to other, sometimes more 
powerful, groups or nations (Montero. 
1986). This is referred to as negative 
ethnocentrism or as xenocentrism (in 
contrast to xenophobia). This phenomenon 
would seem to have implications for group 
performance and mobilization, but these 
relationships have not been explored. It also 
has implications for reducing group 
loyalties: If loyalties are spread across 
several groups, each group is more likely to 
receive less loyalty than it would if it were 
the only group. Findings obtained by Crisp 
et al. (2001) show that cross-category 
identifications reduce intergroup bias. 
Another interesting implication is the case 
where different ingroups have different 
outgroups. Then, which are chosen for 
derogation? How are they scaled in relation 
to the various ingroups? It would seem that 
sentiments expressed toward groups should 
be understood in the context of multiple, 
sometimes contradictory, group identities. 
This is a more complex problem than has 
been addressed in the social identity-social 
cognition literature to date.  
Patriotism and Nationalism 
Implications for reducing ethnocentrism 
come also from another direction. Research 
by Feshbach and his colleagues (Feshbach, 
1987, 1990, Kosterman and Feshbach, 1989) 
suggest that it may be possible to distinguish 
between kinds of ingroup orientations. Their 
factor-analytic studies of expressed attitudes 
revealed two factors. One emphasizes an 
emotional attachment to ingroups without 
feelings of superiority or denigration of other 
groups or countries. They called this 
orientation “patriotism.” The “patriot” can 
indeed feel proud of being an American (or 
any other nationality) without feeling either 
superior or hostile toward others who are not 
Americans – the ingroup is liked even when 
outgroups can also be liked. The other factor 
emphasizes a kind of moral and material 
superiority for one’s own group or country 
(in contrast to liking or attachment per se). 
They called this orientation “nationalism.” 
For the “nationalist,” pride is a result of an 
invidious comparison between one’s own 
and other groups. The ingroup is liked 
because it is compared favorably to various 
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outgroups.5 What then accounts for these 
different orientations? There have been 
several approaches to this question.  
Feshbach’s correlational results showed that 
nationalists were more willing to support 
war but less willing to risk their own lives 
than were patriots. They were not more 
aggressive in their personal behavior than 
were patriots. In effect, nationalism was 
associated more with a competitive and 
militaristic view of the world – with hawkish 
attitudes – while patriotism was associated 
with a more cooperative or peaceful 
approach, as dovish attitudes. Interestingly, 
those with patriotic attitudes indicated a 
stronger attachment to their fathers, a finding 
that may seem counter-intuitive since 
mothers are typically regarded as the more 
nurturing parent. 
Sears’ (1969) review of studies of child 
development shows that feelings are 
developed before cognitions. Early 
sentiments felt or expressed toward groups 
precede content or labeling. The content 
tends to rationalize the feelings and 
                                                 
5 The literatures on stereotyping and ethnocentrism 
are replete with examples of nationalism, not 
patriotism, as these terms are used in this section. 
Most of the theorists on this subject seem to accept 
the acknowledged wisdom that positive ingroup 
descriptions are coincident with negative portrayals of 
other groups. (For a broad survey of writings on this 
topic, enter the google search category, 
“ethnocentrism in inter-group relations. This category 
contains about 500 entries.) This “wisdom” suggests 
that identities are developed by invidious contrast. An 
example comes from Emerson’s depiction of mid-19th 
century England. He notes that the English defined 
who they were by negative symbolic reference to who 
they were not, making France “a kind of blackboard 
on which English character draws its traits in chalk” 
(1966: 94).  And, Pickering chimes in with: “Anti-
Frenchness, and anti-Irishness, served to bolster the 
sense of a superior ‘national character” (2001: 93).  
Nationalist discourse turns on a conception of 
difference with a positive-negative spin. The idea of 
patriotism also recognizes differences but without the 
evaluative trappings.  
distinguishes between nationalism and 
patriotism: Are the feelings justified in terms 
of being superior to others (nationalism) or 
because one’s nation is simply good 
(patriotism)? Less clear are the influences 
that move a child to rationalize his or her 
feelings in one way or the other. We do 
know, however, that the feelings are stronger 
than the cognitions and early attachments – 
whether of the nationalist or patriotic type – 
are more difficult to change than later ones. 
Further, cognitive change may depend on 
prior emotional change (Greenberg et al., 
1993).  
A study by Duckitt (1989) found that 
nationalism (or, in his terms, ethnocentric 
patriotism) was associated with insecure 
group identifications while patriotism was 
associated with secure identifications: The 
more secure individuals felt as members of 
the groups to which they belonged, the more 
healthy their relationship to the group and 
the lower their need for distancing their 
group from others.  
Strong national identities may be associated 
either with increased or decreased trust in 
others. Brehm et al. (2000) showed that for 
many (but not all) of the respondents in their 
cross-cultural survey of national identities, 
stronger identities accompanied greater trust 
in others.  A high or low level of trust in 
others is a variable that distinguishes 
between nationalism and patriotism: 
Nationalists have strong identities 
accompanied by low trust; patriots have 
strong identities and high trust. For some 
demographic and geographic categories, 
high levels of trust accompany weak national 
identities. Respondents in the Brehm et al. 
study with higher levels of education and 
those who lived closest to national borders 
had weak identities but high trust. Those 
with post-materialist values, in particular, 
had high levels of trust but weaker senses of 
national identification.  
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Another interpretation of the distinction is 
that nationalism is merely a more complex 
form of patriotism. If patriotism is 
commitment – a readiness to sacrifice for the 
group – then nationalism is commitment plus 
exclusion of others, a readiness to sacrifice 
(although Feshbach’s data question this 
readiness) bolstered by hostility toward 
others. Patriotism is a simpler relationship 
between the individual and the group. 
Nationalism requires a more elaborate 
matrix embedding one’s own group into a 
set of groups and differentiating among 
them. In this interpretation, patriotism is 
acquired earlier in the socialization process 
and, as a consequence, may be the stronger 
feeling. 
The research reviewed above suggests that 
these may be relatively stable orientations. 
However, the evidence from the simulation 
and laboratory studies of ingroup bias 
reviewed earlier suggests that they are more 
likely to be aroused by the situation. For 
example, patriotic orientations may be 
manifest in non-competitive situations where 
there is less need to derogate other groups. 
The question of interest is whether it is 
possible to arouse nationalist feelings in non-
competitive situations: Must a situation be 
competitive to arouse nationalistic feelings? 
Or, do people bring these feelings to 
situations and, by doing so, create 
competition? A challenge for the practitioner 
is to de-couple ingroup amity from outgroup 
enmity, to build patriotism instead of 
nationalism. At issue is whether the best 
route is through the socialization process or 
by designing situations that encourage such 
feelings.  
The distinction between nationalism and 
patriotism is contested when it takes the 
form of ideologies. These orientations 
capture certain aspects of progressive and 
conservative political ideologies. The 
construal of patriotism used in this section 
corresponds closely to a defining feature of 
progressive patriotism as stated by Coy et al: 
“…the love of one’s nation is not inherently 
incompatible with respect for and even 
identification with others beyond the nation” 
(2003: 469). In their expression of 
patriotism, American progressives 
emphasize the core values of fairness, 
equality. Freedom, justice, and the right of 
dissent (Dreier and Flacks, 2003). Although 
these values have a long historical legacy in 
the U.S., they have only recently been 
publicly defended from attacks made by 
Americans who promote a nationalistic 
brand of loyalty. Current-day American 
progressives rail against the sort of “blind 
nationalism, militaristic drum beating, and 
sheep-like conformism” evident in the 
aftermath of 9/11 (Dreier and Flacks, 2003: 
403). This clash of perspectives on national 
identity served to mobilize a divided 
population, resulting in the largest voter turn 
out in American history. The closely-
contested election was won by the 
“nationalist” candidate. Whether dissent 
turns to revolution during Mr. Bush’s second 
term depends on the kinds of policies 
enacted by his administration. To the extent 
that “patriotic” dissent slows the momentum 
toward further military escalation, revolution 
is less likely to occur.  
Collective Actions 
Actions are discussed in this section in terms 
of the connection between attachments and 
categorizations on the one hand and actions 
taken by groups including mobilizing for 
conflict or war on the other. Following a 
brief discussion of the issue of aggregating 
sentiments expressed by individuals, I 
develop a framework for conceptualizing the 
way that group loyalties lead to collective 
behavior. Focusing primarily on national 
loyalties and actions, the framework 
connects micro-level identity processes with 
macro-level policies and actions. 
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From Individuals’ Sentiments to Collective 
Behavior 
Research on individuals in groups has 
implications for collective action. It is this 
connection that links sentiments expressed 
by individuals to policies and actions taken 
by groups and nations, and is a basis for a 
social psychology of international relations 
(see Druckman, 1990). The laboratory 
research deals largely with attitudes 
expressed and behavior displayed by 
individuals who are placed in contrived 
intergroup situations. Of interest is the 
relevance of this research for actions taken 
by nations, ethnic groups, and other 
collectivities. It is useful to consider the 
problem of relevance before moving to a 
discussion of collective action. Following 
are alternative ways in which the 
connections between levels of analysis can 
be made. 
1) The sentiments expressed by individuals 
aggregate in the form of a collective 
expression similar to the way that votes 
aggregate to determine the outcome of 
elections. This approach assumes that the 
whole is a sum of its parts. 
2) Analogies can be made between 
individual or small group behavior and 
the behavior of leaders, social 
movements, and whole national 
populations. The insights provided from 
the former translate directly to an 
understanding of the latter. This 
approach assumes that national behavior 
is an outward projection of small group 
behavior. 
3) By studying individuals in roles of group 
representatives, as in many of the 
laboratory simulations, we gain an 
understanding of how comparable 
individuals in leadership positions are 
likely to act. It is assumed here that roles 
(and role behaviors) are similar in 
different settings. 
4) The sentiments expressed by laboratory 
subjects are similar to the sentiments 
expressed in public opinion polls about 
particular national policies. These 
opinions influence the direction taken by 
leaders, toward or away from taking 
militant postures. In other words, 
individuals’ sentiments or attitudes 
influence collective behavior through 
public opinion. 
5) Loyalty as positive sentiments expressed 
toward a group is a defining element of 
cohesion which also consists of a sharing 
of attitudes and beliefs. This sort of 
bonding facilitates collective aggressive 
action toward other groups. It is assumed 
that the same or similar group processes 
occur in different kinds of groups and 
group settings.  
6) Since the policy-making process usually 
involves a few individuals, an 
understanding of this process can be 
gained through laboratory policy-making 
simulations; the ease with which 
loyalties can be established in laboratory 
groups and the consequences of such 
loyalties should be similar to the way 
this occurs in small groups of leaders and 
advisors. 
At issue is whether collective behavior can 
be understood from the results of research on 
individual or small-group behavior. By 
linking large-scale social phenomena to the 
way individuals or small groups behave, the 
distinction between levels of analysis is 
preserved without reducing social behavior 
to individual behavior. Others argue that 
group behavior is fundamentally different 
than individual behavior. This argument was 
made long ago by Durkheim (1895) who 
attempted to justify sociology as the study of 
groups rather than the study of individuals in 
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groups. In this regard, Campbell’s (1958) 
observation that groups have more 
entitativity than personalities is relevant: 
When considered in terms of the criteria of 
similarity, pregnance (form), and common 
fate (moving in the same direction), groups 
may be perceived as being more entity-like 
than individuals. However, it has been 
difficult historically to study groups as the 
unit of analysis. (Davis and Singer, 1991, 
discuss the logistical problems.) This line of 
argument favors emergent group properties 
that are not simply an aggregation of 
members’ behavior (see Druckman, 1994b). 
This is consistent with the linking 
perspective summarized in points 3-6 above, 
and seeks explanations for the way 
individuals relate to groups. This perspective 
is reflected in the framework developed in 
the sections to follow.  
The perspective advanced here is similar to 
that espoused by Simon (1991) with regard 
to reducing psychological to neural 
processes. He and his colleagues “believed 
that complex behavior can be reduced to 
neural processes only in successive steps 
(layers of theory), not in a single leap … for 
psychology, a theory at the level of symbols 
located midway between complex thought 
processes and neurons, is essential” (1991: 
191-192). Similarly, a theory of group 
identity may be thought of as being located 
midway between complex collective 
behavior on behalf of a nation and 
sentiments expressed by individuals. The 
steps, or layers of theory, are the linkages 
from collective to group (communal, 
organizational), to individual emotions, 
cognitions, and behaviors. 
A matter frequently addressed in discussions 
of levels of analysis is whether nationalism 
is another form of group identity or a distinct 
kind of identification. The former 
emphasizes similarities, the latter 
differences. Moving away from depicting 
this as an either-or issue, I would like to 
suggest that nationalism both shares features 
with other forms of identity while also 
differing from them. A key shared feature is 
the binary juxtaposition of positive 
sentiments expressed toward one’s own 
group coupled with negative sentiments 
expressed toward others.6  Related issues of 
acquisition and maintenance of these 
sentiments, discussed in earlier sections, 
may also be shared. However, it may seem 
that these similarities are over-shadowed by 
a number of differences.  
Unlike face-to-face groups studied in the 
psychological laboratory, nations are 
abstractions and the attachments of citizens 
to them are largely imagined. (See 
Anderson’s, 1986, treatment of imagined 
communities.) These abstractions gather 
meaning in shared land,7 language,8 and 
                                                 
6 This juxtaposition is also a central tenet of 
ethnocentrism theory, which claims to be a universal 
feature of groups and nations. My evaluation of this 
proposition in a study of simulated nations showed 
support for it: Strong negative correlations were 
obtained for ratings of own and other “nations.” 
Positive correlations would have supported the 
alternative “patriotism theory.” At issue, however, is 
whether these results are essentially limited to small 
interacting groups (see Druckman, 1968). 
7 The importance of land or territory to identity was 
recognized long ago by Rousseau who linked territory 
to the constitution and protection of a people: “By 
thus holding the land, they are quite sure to hold its 
inhabitants” (1978: 130). Connolly (1996) mentions 
the dual contrasting meanings of territory, as a place 
for receiving sustenance and as a place to exercise 
violence. The latter reflects the boundary-maintaining 
feature of territory that functions to keep other people 
out. Failure to do so often fosters reactive movements 
of nationalism that can lead to violence. More 
broadly, Tocqueville (1969) connected territory to 
civilization. Referred to as a ”civi-territorial 
complex,” he observed that territory and civilization 
reinforced each other in the construction of America. 
All of this is to say that land plays a central role in the 
development and maintenance of identities. Informal 
conversations that I have had with a number of 
Australians revealed that after spending time abroad 
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culture.9 As mutually reinforcing bases for 
identities, these three elements strengthen 
the affective attachments to the concept of 
the nation. They provide an emotional 
foundation for the extraordinary acts and 
sacrifices performed by some citizens as 
well as for the imperial adventures proudly 
undertaken by nations defining themselves 
as – or aspiring to become -- empires. They 
also lend support to policy doctrines and 
more general ideological world-views that 
justify calls for action on behalf of the 
nation. (Note in this regard the popular 
support for American mobilization for the 
war in Iraq.) This support connects the 
                                                                          
they have a yearning to return to the country 
primarily because of an attachment to the land. Note 
also the quote in the opening to this essay about the 
value placed by the Chinese on the land. 
8 Language may be an important feature of individual 
and collective identity often overlooked in the 
literature on nationalism and ethnicity. Nations-states 
are often preoccupied with establishing a common 
language and culture through mass education, and this 
is a source of language conflicts. May (2001) argues 
that internal conflicts can be avoided if nations come 
to terms with the increasing plurality of language 
communities within their borders. One solution, he 
suggests, is to encourage national decision makers to 
rethink the language-identity link by recognizing the 
legitimacy of minority languages in the context of a 
shared national identity that encompasses these sub-
national or ethnic identities. This argument 
contributes to a growing debate on multiculturalism 
and the politics of language. (See Laitin (2000) for 
cross-national analyses of the role that language plays 
in political conflicts among policy-making 
communities within nations.) 
9 Culture is often thought to be a distinguishing 
feature between national or ethnic and other types of 
group identities. Nations and ethnic groups have 
cultures; laboratory groups do not. This wisdom can 
be challenged by the results of an experimental study. 
Jacobs and Campbell (1961) showed that laboratory 
cultures or traditions can be perpetuated through 
generations of research subjects. To the extent that 
the laboratory is a compressed-time microcosm of 
society, the mechanisms of transmission of traditions 
may be similar and, thus, relevant to the issue of 
extrapolation from laboratory results about self-other 
sentiments to national attachments.   
emotional to the cognitive aspects of 
nationalism. 
For a number of scholars, nationalism is 
described as an ideology which purports to 
provide a remedy for human alienation 
(Kedourie, 1993). The fall of Soviet-style 
socialism did not usher in an age without 
ideological direction – or an “end to 
history.” Rather, it produced a revival of 
nationalism, referred to by Kedourie as “that 
other ideological obsession” (1993: xvii). 
Like socialism, nationalist regimes have 
been anything but guarantors of prosperity or 
honest government. This may be due in large 
part to the exclusionist ideologies and 
coercive manipulation of populations 
practiced by the leaders of these regimes. 
Over time, however, the coerced identities 
will whither as opportunities for re-
settlement become available. Ideologies 
alone cannot assure loyalty. Strong 
psychological affiliations – in the form of 
patriotism or nationalism – are needed. 
These affiliations are at the heart of 
nationalism just as they are the essence of 
attachments to other types of groups. In the 
sections to follow, I discuss the role of group 
attachments in efforts to mobilize citizens 
for action. 
Group Loyalty and Collective Action  
The research reviewed earlier on ingroup 
bias and stereotyping contributes to our 
understanding of identity and attachments to 
groups. Functions served by identity include 
enhanced self-esteem, reduced uncertainty, 
and perceptual discrimination that reduces 
cognitive or social complexity. Such 
functions, in turn, reinforce the group 
attachment. With regard to nations, the 
attachment is referred to as patriotism. 
However, when combined with the 
derogation of outgroups, the attachment 
(identity, bias) can contribute to inter-group 
conflict, referred to earlier as nationalism. 
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The conflict may take the form of 
competition which is regulated by 
institutionally-defined rules. Or it may take 
the form of violent conflict between groups 
that are not bound by the same normative 
institutional framework. Focussing attention 
primarily on the latter, I discuss in this 
section the way that positive sentiments 
toward -- or attachments to -- ingroups can 
be mobilized for collective action against 
other groups.  
One issue is the extent to which people are 
willing to suspend judgment in acting on 
behalf of the group: When do emotions or 
emotional appeals trump rational appraisals? 
Sumner’s (1906) ethnocentrism syndrome 
emphasized extreme behavior on behalf of a 
group, a willingness to fight and die for the 
group. Campbell (1972) re-interpreted this 
aspect of the syndrome in terms of altruism, 
emphasizing the element of ultimate 
personal sacrifice. Stern (1995) made the 
case that emotional attachments to groups 
override calculations of self interest, 
especially when the group is threatened (see 
also Sturmer et al., 1998). Blake and Mouton 
(1962) argued that group representation is 
the primary determinant of competitive 
behavior and inflexibility in negotiation. 
Representatives may go to great lengths in 
defending their constituents’ interests and 
positions, although the extent of their 
commitment or inflexibility has been shown 
to depend on aspects of the negotiating 
situation other than their role definition 
(Druckman, 1994a). These observations 
suggest that group members would be 
receptive to appeals made by their leaders to 
mobilize for actions directed against other 
groups. But, does action follow directly from 
receptivity? Or, are there factors that 
intervene between readiness and collective 
action? What does the evidence suggest?  
The stronger the identification with the 
group, the more members are receptive to a 
variety of appeals to mobilize for action: The 
laboratory evidence reviewed above shows 
how easily loyalties can be established but 
also how easily they can be re-directed. But 
cognitive factors are also likely to influence 
receptiveness. Eidelson (2000) argues that a 
group’s worldview can trigger or constrain 
mobilization resulting in intergroup conflict. 
Five of six of his worldviews can act as 
triggers: viewing the group to be superior, 
treated unjustly, vulnerable, distrusted, or 
perceiving the conflict in zero-sum terms. 
The sixth, referred to as a “helplessness 
worldview,” may act to constrain 
mobilization. Whether these worldviews 
actually trigger or constrain action depends 
on such factors as centrality, salience, 
functionality, the confidence with which it is 
held, ease of establishment, and resistance to 
change (Bar-Tal, 1990). It also depends on 
the extent to which group members share the 
view. Even prevailing worldviews may be 
ineffective triggers if sub-groups demur 
from them and, thus, reject calls for 
mobilization. Sub-groups can be moderating 
influences on appeals to take collective 
action; they can also be polarizing influences 
when they hold even more extreme views. 
Less clear is the direction of causality 
between the worldviews and conflict: While 
the worldviews may be precipitants of 
conflict, the conflict may also serve to 
further reinforce and simplify the 
worldviews. An issue, however, is whether 
and how perceptions of group members 
aggregate for a group worldview. How are 
we to judge whether all or most members of 
the mobilized group share the same 
worldview?, How stable are these group 
perceptions? (See the discussion on levels of 
analysis in the previous section.) 
Groups vary in the extent to which their 
members share a common worldview. Some 
groups may be characterized as having a 
more coherent worldview than others, and 
this has implications for mobilization. With 
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regard to societies, strong ethnic or sub-
group identifications are barriers to 
assimilation, which can be seen as hindering 
societal or national collective action. The 
barriers are increased to the extent that 
members identify more strongly with the 
ethnic category than with the super-ordinate 
(national) category. Smith (2000) showed 
that strong identification with a group 
perceived to be disadvantaged (such as 
ethnic minorities) propels group members 
toward collective action directed against 
another group viewed as being responsible 
for the deprivations (such as majorities). 
Intra-societal divisions militate against social 
harmony. From an assimilationist 
perspective, subgroups are encouraged to 
define their allegiances entirely at a 
superordinate, societal level. A competing 
multicultural perspective “assumes that 
ethnic (subgroup) identities are inescapable 
and fundamental to the self-concept; as a 
result, individuals are motivated to retain 
their cultural heritages” (Hornsey and Hogg, 
2000: 145). This perspective addresses the 
dual identity needs of many individuals. 
They are recognized also by Hornsey and 
Hogg’s (2000) concept of identity threat 
discussed earlier. These authors show how 
subgroup identities can be encouraged in the 
context of a larger, superordinate 
identification. The objective is to increase 
social harmony between subgroups while, at 
the same time, providing a basis for 
mobilizing diverse constituencies for 
collective action.  
Of interest are the strategies or appeals that 
influence the relative intensity of the 
competing identities with an ethnic minority 
or with a majority. In his review of the 
literature on the psychological aspects of 
ethnic nationalism, Azzi (1997) discusses 
three types of strategies: persuasive appeals 
to self interests, cognitive over-
simplification of group categories and 
fomenting violent action toward outgroups. .  
One type of appeal is to group members’ self 
interests. To the extent that members are 
persuaded that achieving their self interests 
is contingent on achieving the group’s 
(ethnic or national) goals, they are more 
likely to act on behalf of the group. This 
appeal is likely to be effective when 
members view the group as being 
instrumental in reducing a perceived 
deprivation or in providing opportunities for 
social mobility. However, people may place 
less emphasis on their own interests when 
group loyalties are strong: They may be 
motivated to act on behalf of the group even 
when such actions have limited benefits or 
are costly to themselves (Sturmer et al., 
1998).  
Another strategy consists of simplifying the 
ideology that casts problems in terms of 
ingroup-outgroup categorical dichotomies. 
By exaggerating the divergence between 
ingroup (ethnic minority or nation) and 
outgroup (the larger nation in which the 
ethnic group resides or another nation), 
political elites encourage members to 
attribute frustrations or disadvantages to the 
outgroup rather than to the ingroup (Taylor 
and McKirnan, 1984). Kramer and Brewer 
(1984) showed that the exaggerated 
divergence also leads members to have 
greater confidence that other ingroup 
members will “rally around the flag.” These 
strategies may have the effect of increasing 
the inter-dependence between self interest 
and group interest. However, it is also 
important to increase members’ subjective 
probabilities of success for the collective 
action (Hechter et al., 1982).  
A third strategy consists of instigating 
violence toward the targeted group. For 
ethnic minorities, violent actions may serve 
to encourage retaliation that galvanizes or 
strengthens members’ support for their 
(weaker) group. For nations, citizens can 
take pride in military success as illustrated 
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by the U.S. role in the Persian Gulf war or, 
more recently, in Afghanistan. In addition, 
violence may play a role in the creation and 
crystallization of political or community 
boundaries (Dandeker, 1997). Each of these 
strategies can be used effectively by leaders 
of ethnic minorities seeking separation from 
nation-states as well as by the political elites 
of nations seeking to submerge sub-group 
identifications in order to create a larger 
national identification. The identifications -- 
with the smaller or larger entity -- are further 
reinforced by effective mobilizations for 
collective action. 
A Path from Loyalties to Collective Action  
The issue of mobilizing sentiments for 
collective action requires a more 
sophisticated analysis that includes both 
individual and group psychology as well as 
societal conditions. The challenge is to 
situate the loyalties in a larger framework. 
One approach consists of connecting 
individuals’ loyalties or attachments to 
actions taken by collective actors through a 
path of social processes. The first connection 
is from loyalties to public opinion, also 
referred to as the spread of opinion through a 
population. Widely held or shared 
sentiments are often expressed in opinion 
polls which get the attention of politicians 
and other elites (Mueller, 1973). Although 
citizens only interact with others who are in 
close proximity, the shared sentiments are 
magnified through media representations. 
The influence process has been shown to be 
bi-directional, from citizens, referred to also 
as “partisans,” to elites, referred to also as 
“authorities,” and vice versa (Gamson, 1967; 
Druckman, 1980). The effect of interest is 
the way shared sentiments impact on 
political representatives. A large literature 
exists on the concept of representation, 
which I will not review here. (From a 
political science perspective, see Pitkin, 
1967). Suffice it to say that representatives 
are constrained (in democracies) by 
constituencies to whom they are 
accountable. And, while they surely can 
influence those constituencies, they cannot 
afford to deviate much from their expressed 
preferences. 
Constraints on negotiating representatives 
can be thought about in terms of negotiating 
flexibility. The latitude that representatives 
have for making a deal may be influenced by 
various aspects of group identity. In 
particular, three aspects have been put 
forward in recent work: the process of 
negotiating identities, durability of identities, 
and spread of identities (Druckman, 2001a). 
Identities are “negotiated” regularly in most 
democratic societies. They are largely 
coerced – in the sense of sanctions for 
deviation -- in more authoritarian regimes 
(“we have no choice but to be Serbs”). 
Coerced identities reduce the flexibility of 
negotiating representatives. Durable or 
sustained identities (“we are unshakable in 
our loyalty to Serbia”) are more likely to 
lead to firmer commitments to negotiating 
positions than more fluid or changing 
identities. Widely spread (vs. limited spread) 
identities through a population (“we are all 
Serbs”) may be a source of constituent 
pressure on representatives to adhere to 
preferred positions or strategies. These three 
aspects can be construed as dimensions 
within which different kinds of countries, 
regimes, or historical periods can be 
compared. Placing this three-factor model in 
the context of collective action, it would be 
interesting to ascertain how they moderate 
the relationship between mobilization for 
action in conflict and negotiating flexibility.  
A start in this direction has been taken in a 
recent project. For each of three types of 
collective actions – violent, non-violent, and 
humanitarian missions – we as about the 
relative influence on decisions of identity 
and contextual variables. Role players are 
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presented with scenarios that contain these 
variables. A pair-comparison task is used to 
structure their judgments about the relative 
importance of five variables: motivation to 
act, efficacy of the acting unit, type of 
political system, durability of citizen 
identity, and spread of citizen support for the 
action. Of interest is the question whether 
the context variables (motivation and 
efficacy) are more or less important elements 
in their decision than the identity variables 
(system, durability, and spread). Early 
results indicate that, for both violent and 
humanitarian actions, motivation and spread 
are judged to be the most important 
considerations in the decision to act or not to 
act. An implication is that collective action 
decisions (war, disaster relief) made by 
national representatives are driven primarily 
by a sense of shared urgency in the form of 
widespread population support for a 
particular type of action. 
These national representatives typically 
function in small policy-making groups. 
Strong evidence for group-think or 
conformity phenomena in these groups 
makes deviation from a kind of party line 
anathema (Janis, 1989, t’Hart, 1990). They 
will reflect, and exaggerate, nationalist 
sentiments, propelling them to take the lead 
in advancing aggressive policies; note in this 
regard the political unpopularity of dovish 
policies in all societies, by the left and the 
right (Mueller, 1973). The result is a set of 
policies that are developed through the lens 
of national self, and self-serving, images. 
Often these policies lead to judgments of 
superior strength or moral conviction for the 
nation, a (mis)perception that can have 
disastrous consequences. Two examples are 
U.S. policies toward China and the 
authoritarian manipulation of Serbian 
sentiments by Milosevic (see Druckman, 
1994, for other examples).  
The intertwining of loyalty and cohesion 
produces a set of norms that encourage 
aggressive actions and that become shared 
by substantial numbers of publics within the 
polity who show little tolerance for 
deviation. Widely-shared norms may harden 
into ideologies that rationalize and reinforce 
pernicious stereotypes as Fyfe (1992) 
observes with the example of racial 
distinctions. The resulting collective action 
taken by the State in the name of the nation 
reinforces the loyalties that we began with, 
especially if successful as in the example of 
the U.S. role in the Persian Gulf war. The 
collective action feeds-back to individuals’ 
loyalties in a loop. The linear but recursive 
route taken is depicted as follows:  
 
Æ Loyalties ----Æ public opinion ----Æ 
political representatives ----Æ policy-
making groups ----Æ policies ----Æ norms -
---Æ collective actions --Æ  
 
This path focuses attention on influence and 
decision-making processes within societies. 
It can be broadened further by considering 
variability in a society’s political institutions, 
internal or external events that mark 
transitions in regimes or in a society’s 
political culture, and differences in 
receptivity from diverse citizens or 
constituencies to appeals made by policy-
making elites. I turn now to a discussion of 
this broadened framework. 
Nationalism and Mobilizing for War  
Probing further into the link between 
collective action and loyalties, we can better 
understand the role of nationalism in 
warfare. In this discussion we are moving 
from relatively mild forms of group identity, 
as studied by social psychologists, to the 
more destructive forms of national action 
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studied by some analysts of international 
relations (e.g., Gellner, 1997; Comaroff and 
Stern, 1995). An important aspect of the 
latter is the recruitment of citizens to fight 
the wars. Mobilization depends both on the 
interests of political decision makers and the 
receptiveness of the citizenry to their 
appeals. With regard to interests, a regime’s 
legitimacy is likely to be important: The less 
legitimate a government (defined in terms of 
performance or political structure as 
authoritarian or democratic), the greater the 
incentive to provoke nationalistic sentiments 
that support conflict. Presumably, conflict is 
thought to divert attention away from the 
issue of legitimacy, unite the population, and 
consolidate the regime’s power. One way to 
provoke nationalist sentiments (or “flag 
waving”) is to construct myths about the 
state in relation to foreigners: For example, 
Stern (1995) regards myths as analogies such 
as the nation as family to whom certain 
obligations are owed. Myths are reinforced 
within policy-making groups by the group-
think phenomena referred to above and 
spread more widely through the media. 
Citizens are most receptive to them under 
such conditions as: a) when the society has 
weak evaluative institutions such as the 
media or universities, b) during economic 
crises, and c) during periods of transition 
(see Van Evera, 1995). Fluid national 
identities (by which is meant momentary) 
also make citizens more receptive to myths 
and, thus, they are easier to mobilize. 
However, just as fluid identities make 
citizens more malleable or manipulable, they 
also make them more subject to change with 
the experience of combat as Bienen (1995) 
notes and Lynn (1984) demonstrates. For 
this reason, a more durable nationalism (by 
which is meant relatively unchanging) may 
sustain combat even if it is more difficult to 
manipulate by policy elites. It provides a 
source of stable support for military 
mobilization.  
Several variables are identified in this 
discussion: a regime’s legitimacy, a society’s 
evaluative institutions, economic crises, 
leadership transitions, and fluidity of identity 
with the group or nation. These variables 
define the opportunities available to 
decision-making elites to influence citizens. 
They also serve as indicators of societal 
stability or closeness to societal collapse. 
Each variable can be hypothesized to be 
related to ease of mobilization and evaluated 
empirically.  
A type of myth promulgated by leaders is the 
illusion of homogeneity. Connor (1994) 
discusses the myths of hemispheric, 
continental, regional, and state unity. While 
he devotes his discussion to exploding these 
myths with historical evidence, he also notes 
that they can have powerful influences on 
perceptions. The challenge for leaders intent 
on consolidating their power is to perpetuate 
the image of a common historical culture, 
such as “Europeanness” or “we are all 
Americans,” among different language 
communities: For example, as Connor notes, 
“prior to the demise of the Soviet Union, 
numerous authorities on South Central Asia 
maintained that Kazakhs, Turkman, Usbeks, 
and others viewed themselves first and 
foremost as a single Muslem people” 
(1994:118). For leaders intent on exploiting 
divisions between communities within a 
region or state, the tactical challenge is to 
engender and sustain the image of distinctive 
ancestral roots and cultures among the 
different language communities. Milosevic’s 
attempts to arouse Serbian nationalism 
illustrates a divide and conquer strategy that 
culminated in ethnic cleansing campaigns 
against non-Serbians in former Yugoslavia.  
The variable identified here is the extent to 
which the state or nation is described as 
being homogeneous. (Note in this regard the 
research reviewed above on perceived 
entitativity.) Related to this is the extent to 
  
Explaining National Identity  
ACPACS Occasional Paper Number 2  Page 26 
which citizens are receptive to the image or 
myth. Citizens may be more prone to 
nationalist myths in non-democratic regimes 
that lack academic freedoms – or strong 
academic institutions – and a free press. 
However, it is also be the case that freedom 
per se does not assure that myths will be 
scrutinized. Van Evera (1995) points out that 
scrutiny is less likely by faculties -- 
including those in strong institutions -- that 
pursue research agendas with little 
connection to the actual world of domestic 
and international politics. These are 
additional variables hypothesized to 
influence a leader’s (or policy-making 
group’s) attempts to mobilize citizens for 
action.  
These processes can be organized into a 
framework designed for understanding the 
connection between nationalism and war: I 
prefer to consider nationalistic sentiments as 
one among several factors leading to 
conflict. As shown in my earlier chapter 
(Druckman, 2001b, Figure 4.1), mythmaking 
and mobilization are understood against the 
background of goals, structures, relations 
with minorities, and legitimacy, as well as a 
variety of internal and external conditions. 
Looking at that figure, nationalism refers to 
fluid or durable identities (a background 
factor) and responsiveness to myths created 
usually by decision making elites (a 
process): New myths are easier to create 
among citizens with fluid identities; older 
myths are more likely to be sustained when 
citizens have durable identities that coincide 
with the images. These are some of the 
factors that converge on an outcome – which 
could be a decision to fight or to sustain 
combat – with implications for legitimacy, 
power, and relations, referred to in the 
framework as “the aftermath.” The feedback 
loop from consequents (aftermath) to 
antecedents indicate that the adjusted 
evaluations following the conflict lead to 
another cycle of decisions about continuing 
the conflict. For example, victories may 
increase citizens’ nationalism and reinforce 
leaders’ hegemonic goals, both of which 
may fuel further violent conflict. 
Mobilization is easier to accomplish in non-
democratic societies with a small middle 
class (Van Evera, 1995). It is also more 
likely when there is an imagined or real 
external threat and when minorities are 
subject to discrimination or used as 
scapegoats (Smith, 2000). Another way of 
construing relations among these variables is 
in terms of a rough time ordering as follows: 
Political structure Æ  size of middle class Æ 
extent of economic and political transitions 
Æ extent of social disintegration  Æ  extent 
of perceived external threat  Æ 
manipulation of nationalist sentiments Æ 
fluidity of national identification Æ 
mobilization of citizens Æ intra or inter-
state conflict Æ outcomes of conflict Æ 
post-conflict changes Æ nation rebuilding. 
The picture painted here is that of a 
controlling leadership that can manipulate 
the national sentiments of a malleable 
population. Mobilization is further facilitated 
in periods of transition, economic crises, or 
social disintegration. Posen’s (1995) 
treatment of military mobilization reinforces 
this picture and adds other considerations. In 
addition to external threats, he claims that 
national insecurity about defending the 
nation encourages leaders to stimulate 
aggressive nationalism, especially when they 
are also insecure about their own legitimacy. 
Although this is not a new insight, he 
develops his argument further in less 
intuitive directions. One proposition put 
forth is that mass literacy facilitates military 
mobilization in two ways: Literate people 
are more susceptible to propaganda and they 
can learn to operate the complex 
technologies of modern warfare. Another 
proposition is that nationalism is weakened 
by nuclear forces for two reasons: Nuclear 
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nations demand less of their citizens and the 
nation feels more secure or less threatened. 
Conventional (non-nuclear) competitions 
and land armies “depend on the greatest 
reserves of human courage and 
commitment” (Posen, 1995:171). This can 
be interpreted as an argument for nuclear 
forces, and even nuclear proliferation, in the 
sense that they serve to reduce the kind of 
aggressive nationalism that leads to warfare. 
However, while widespread nationalist 
sentiments in non-nuclear countries may 
facilitate mobilization for combat, these 
sentiments may also dissipate during the 
course of the combat experience as Lynn’s 
(1984) study of armies of the earlier French 
republics makes evident. 
Posen identifies the variables of 
international competition, mass army 
mobilization, technology, mass literacy, and 
nationalist ideology and highlights the way 
that they are inter-connected. Emphasized 
here, as in the framework above, is the 
influence of an interplay of domestic or 
internal (technology, literacy) and 
international or external (international 
competition/threat) factors on a citizenry’s 
receptivity to nationalist ideologies and calls 
for mobilization. It also connects context 
(international competition) with the 
psychological processes of receptivity 
(indicated by mass literacy), commitment 
(discouraged by advanced technologies), and 
sentiments (manipulated attachments that 
lead to a willingness to fight and die for the 
nation). These connections further illuminate 
the kind of micro-macro level framework put 
forth in this paper. They are the basis for 
hypotheses that can be evaluated with multi-
method research designs including surveys 
for assessing attitudes and sentiments, 
archival and events data sources for 
measuring literacy and international 
cooperation, and simulations for 
demonstrating causation. This is a next step 
in the development of a theory that relates 
individuals’ sentiments to collective action. 
Of course positive sentiments toward the 
nation can also be mobilized for peaceful 
activities, including humanitarian missions. 
Citizens in societies that have cultivated a 
civic form of nationalism (or patriotism) are 
less prone to mobilize at the whim of 
nationalist leaders concerned more with 
enhancing their own power than with the 
welfare of their country’s citizens. Writing 
about Western Europe, Schopflen observes 
that “the strength of civic elements of 
nationhood, as expressed in the multiple and 
cross-cutting identities and interests of 
individuals and groups, loyalty to the state, 
coupled with the attractiveness of the 
integration process, are likely to be 
substantial enough to offset occasional 
upsurges of ethnic or even ethno-national 
mobilization” (1995:57). A widely shared 
commitment to democratic institutions 
coupled with a tradition of bargaining and 
compromise provide strong countervailing 
forces to engaging in nationalist conflicts 
abroad and ethnic conflicts at home. They 
also support peace-building efforts designed 
to foster cross-cutting loyalties that militate 
against destabilizing conflict spirals. This 
pattern of loyalties is the basis for 
developing civic institutions – or a civic 
nationhood – that function in turn to 
reinforce and sustain it. They de-emphasize 
the ethnic elements of nationhood which are 
characterized by overlapping loyalties that 
lead to instability and reduced prospects for 
building democracies.  
Conclusions 
The research on group identity has focused 
on a) the functions served by identity such as 
increasing self-esteem or reducing 
uncertainty, b) categorizations of ingroups 
and outgroups regarded as stereotypes, and 
c) group influence, conformity and deviance. 
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This focus is primarily on the individual in 
the group, examining perceptions, 
judgments, and attitudes. In this paper I have 
discussed the etiologies, manifestations, and 
consequences of group identities as well as 
their fluidity and durability. However, the 
implications of identities for actions are 
limited by what the research does not 
consider, namely, inter-group relations. 
Focusing attention on small and large groups 
or collectivities, studies of inter-group and 
international relations deal with issues of 
political power, ideologies and interests, 
mobilizing members for action, and conflict 
including the motivation to compete (or 
fight) and defend a group. An attempt was 
made in this paper to connect identity-
formation and sustenance with collective 
behavior and, by so doing, link the 
individual and social levels of analysis. 
We have learned that group attachments 
have certain functions for individuals and 
that these functions are both motivational (as 
in self-esteem enhancement) and cognitive 
(as in uncertainty reduction). To the extent 
that these functions are served, the 
individual is likely to act on behalf of the 
group, to contribute to and be influenced by 
the group’s norms and culture, and to use it 
as an opportunity to transcend the self or to 
view the self as being integral to the 
collective (Kelman, 1988). These group 
identities can, however, be a problem for 
inter-group relations. Rarely is the group 
considered as being synonymous with all of 
humanity. Typically, individuals identify 
with particular kinds of groups that can be 
distinguished from other groups in terms of 
language, customs, ideology, economics, or 
even ascriptive characteristics such as 
gender and age. Hence, dividing lines occur: 
Ingroups are distinguished in preferential 
ways from outgroups, and the groups 
compete with each other for scarce political 
(power and influence) and economic 
(material) resources. The competition is 
restrained in some social systems and in 
some situations; it is aggressive or virulent 
in other contexts. Attempts made to 
understand this difference turn on the way 
identities manifest themselves in collective 
action, including the relationship between 
nationalistic sentiments and mobilization 
discussed in this paper. 
With regard to the resolution of conflicts 
between groups, it is useful to distinguish 
between the ideational and the material 
aspects of identification. Cycles of polarized 
and de-polarized conflict occur between 
groups through time as they or their 
representatives interact to settle their 
differences. Unresolved differences in 
interests further polarize the groups 
ideologically; the polarized ideologies in 
turn intensify the conflicting interests. 
Without mediating mechanisms, the conflict 
cycle would perpetuate in a trajectory toward 
possible annihilation. Third-party 
intervention, in various forms, can serve 
important functions. So too can attempts to 
design social systems in ways that 
emphasize cross-cutting rather than 
overlapping identities (for more on this 
perspective see Druckman and Zechmeister, 
1973; for a case application, see Druckman 
and Green, 1995). We need to learn more 
about these processes and mechanisms. They 
are at the juncture where the theory and 
research discussed in this paper meet the 
practices of negotiation and third-party 
intervention.    
Avenues for Further Research 
The discussion in this paper suggests a 
number of ideas for additional research 
summarized in this final session. Several key 
ideas are presented for each major part of the 
essay. 
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Group Attachments 
(1) It would be interesting to learn 
whether uncertainty reduction (or other 
positive effects of group membership) 
can lead to increased ingroup attraction 
without the corresponding outgroup 
derogation that defines ethnocentrism. 
What are the conditions that increase 
patriotic rather than nationalistic 
identifications? 
(2) Another interesting question concerns 
the relationship between group loyalty 
and group process. Do strengthened 
loyalties increase the pressure on 
group members to endorse similar 
views and strategies in the manner of a 
“groupthink?” 
(3) It would be important to learn more 
about the conditions that intensify (or 
lessen) the coupling of group 
identification and discrimination. 
When are these cycles accentuated? 
When do they become manifest in 
collective action leading to war? Is 
there a threshold of intensity which, 
when passed, becomes a point of no 
return? 
Group Categorization 
(1) The cognitive economy functions 
served by stereotypes, including 
arguments about accuracy, can be pit 
against the social dysfunctions of 
discrimination fostered by them. A 
practical research question is how 
these cognitive functions can be 
satisfied without the negative social 
consequences that eventuate. 
(2) The relationship between the cognitive 
processes of categorization and the 
motivational processes of group 
identification needs to be further 
clarified. Do stronger identifications 
co-vary with more rigid 
categorizations or stronger perceived 
entitativity? Are these mutually-
reinforcing processes? Or, are they 
time-lagged with categorizations 
(cognitions) following identities and 
commitments (emotions)? 
(3) A research challenge is to untangle the 
complex web of affiliations in societies 
where citizens have multiple, 
conflicting identities. Which group 
memberships evince stronger (or 
weaker) loyalties? How are the various 
non-membership groups scaled in 
terms of social distance from the 
ingroups? 
Collective Action  
(1) Group or national world-views remain 
elusive. Survey research can contribute 
to the documentation of sharing among 
a population of views that encourage 
mobilization and invasion of foreign 
countries. Longitudinal panel surveys 
would help to gauge the stability of 
these views. 
(2) Only modest empirical work has been 
done on the conditions that lead up to 
decisions made by collectivities to act. 
In particular, the way in which national 
loyalties – as compared to other factors 
such as motivation and readiness to act 
-- influence policies and contribute to 
norms that encourage collective action 
is a question that can be addressed 
with methodologies of process tracing, 
path analysis, and scenario-based 
approaches.  
(3) Little is known about the conditions 
that foster civic or ethnic-based 
nationalism. A research strategy would 
consist of performing focused case 
comparisons of countries (and 
historical time periods) that differ on 
the prevailing pattern of loyalties or 
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group identifications, as cross-cutting 
or overlapping.  
The more ambitious research challenge is to 
forge a connection among the three parts of 
this essay, attachments, categorization, and 
action. This would entail examining the 
mutually reinforcing processes of identity, 
stereotyping, and readiness for mobilization 
to act on behalf of the nation. A circular 
pattern of relationships is perhaps a better 
way of capturing the interplay than positing 
any particular causal direction. Advances in 
such research methodologies as path 
modeling holds promise for analyses of data 
collected on each of the parts of the 
framework developed in this paper (e.g., 
Maruyama, 1998).  
Finally, a few broad topics relevant to 
identity have received only limited attention 
in this essay. One is the role of group 
identity in nation-building. The tension that 
exists in many countries of the world 
between local, provincial identities and 
national, cosmopolitan loyalties would seem 
to have important implications for 
governance and participation in world 
organizations. Another topic concerns the 
role of national identities in regional and 
multilateral politics. A question of interest is 
the influence of the more insulated national 
loyalties on willingness to cooperate with 
other nations in security and trade alliances 
or on other joint endeavors. A third topic 
would focus on the various sources for 
national identity - land, language, and 
culture. Mentioned in notes 7, 8, and 9, these 
sources may vary in strength and either 
conflict or complement one another. And, a 
fourth area of interest is the connection 
between nationalism or patriotism and 
various sub or extra-national identifications, 
including religion, profession, social class, 
gender, and age. Probes into the similarities 
and differences among these identities would 
shed light on the prospects for a more 
general theory of group identity.10  
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